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Abstract 
 
In the US fiscal year 2019, Trump and the US Congress 
agreed to provide foreign military assistance funds 
approximately $400 million to Ukraine. In its 
distribution process, Trump procrastinated the release as 
he decided to halt that in July. Two months later, he 
changed it and released the assistance. This study seeks 
to analyze the dynamics of that rapid change policy. In 
doing so, it employs qualitative research, particularly 
the process-tracing method as its function to trace the 
causal mechanism of the research puzzle. By applying 
Neoclassical Realism provided by Ripsman, Taliaferro, 
and Lobell, this paper demonstrates some findings:  The 
halt policy is regarding Trump's political endeavor to 
weaken and outperform his domestic political rival, the 
Democratic Party. Trump asked the Ukrainian 
counterpart to investigate Joe Biden's corruption and 
reverted Russia hack scandal in the last US presidential 
election in exchange for the release of military 
assistance. However, the policy was hampered by some 
domestic elements, (1) some of the Foreign Policy 
Executive thought the halt policy was not following the 
US national security, hence they acted as 
whistleblowers issuing Trump personal interest in the 
issue to gain wider public awareness; (2) US Strategic 
Culture, a perception that shapes Russia as among US 
enemy. Thus, that halt policy is perceived against US 
collective value; (3) US check and balance system; (4) 
Trump consideration that the halt policy can jeopardize 
his position as president in the next election. These 
factors contribute to the release of assistance. 
 
 
© 2020 Published by Indonesia Defense University   
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INTRODUCTION  
Foreign military assistance by definition is 
the transfer of weaponry, equipment, 
funds, training, or leadership to recipient 
military force (Mott, 2002). However, 
what does it mean for states to do such 
cordiality manner whereas foreign military 
assistance can cause them to spend more 
on unnecessary costs and energy. Let 
alone, as the assistance turn the recipient 
states gain more power, the variable of 
defection in the recipient state, as it is well 
understood in international politics, can 
result in the assistance to become 
detrimental for the donor state. 
Some prominent scholars argue that the 
rationale of states to provide military 
assistance to the others, despite substantial 
costs, is because they aspire something 
larger than the incurred cost. To be exact, 
that includes certain political objectives to 
be pursued and contextualized. Among 
other explanations, studies portray that it is 
frequently directed to create balancing 
behavior, protect or oust the regime, 
preserve or overthrow hegemony, increase 
state security or power, disseminate 
democratic values, conduct ways for 
conflict prevention, or shape a new amity 
pattern (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; David, 
1991; Geis, Brock, & Müller, 2006; Cottey 
& Foster, 2004; Mearsheimer, 2001).  
Viewed from historical perspectives, 
military assistance in practice has occurred 
for a long time, even longer than the 
emergence of the nation-state model itself. 
The earliest form relating to military 
assistance was the hiring of foreign 
military advisors and mercenaries. Political 
entities at that time often asked for help 
from outside military experts who could 
organize mercenaries and hooked the ex-
enemy forces up in the hope of increasing 
their war capability (Stoker, 2007).  
In the meantime, the configuration of 
contemporary military assistance is more 
diverse and is no longer limited to the 
advisory functions. Some of the 
contemporary forms include the 
deployment of military as peacekeeping 
force under the United Nations (UN) 
mandate, arms sale, weapons grants, up to 
capacity building programs. As Cottey and 
Foster (Cottey & Foster, 2004) noted, the 
varied military assistance configuration is 
based on the growing awareness and 
strategic rationale of states (especially 
those in Western) that militaristic issues 
can not merely be beneficial for the sake of 
defense, deterrence, compellence, or 
swaggering (Art, 2017), but also has 
widely been seen as a security and foreign 
policy tool. 
While in practice this topic gains 
traction to many states, scholarly works 
concerning comprehending the state’s 
strategic goals will become noteworthy to 
deepen and enrich our understanding of 
this topic. Against this backdrop, this 
article aims to explain it in the case of the 
US-Ukraine in 2019 as a research focus. 
This is chosen due to the recent 
development in US foreign policy under 
President Trump that demonstrated a batch 
of discrepancy with the US traditional role 
in foreign and security policy, making it 
possible for further theoretical debate and 
development. 
The United States is one of the states 
with very long military assistance 
experience either as a recipient during the 
American Revolutionary War when 
George Washington was assisted by Baron 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, ex-
Prussian military, or as a donor with 
several programs, such as International 
Military Education and Training (IMET), 
Foreign Military Interaction (FMI), 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Joint 
Combined Exchange Training (JCET), 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Emergency 
drawdown and Excess Defense Articles 
(EDA) and Enhanced International 
Peacekeeping Capabilities (EDA) EIPC) 
(Cottey & Foster, 2004; Stoker, 2007). 
To put Ukraine in this context, the US 
has long been involved in carrying out the 
agenda of security cooperation since 
Ukraine gained independence from the 
Soviet Union back in 1991.  
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The first important stage encouraging 
security relations between the two states 
was the signing of the Budapest 
Memorandum on Security Assurance 
between the US, Russia, Britain in 1994 in 
which the three parties agreed to maintain 
security assurances against threats or use 
of force and against the territorial integrity 
or political independence in exchange for 
disarming Ukraine nuclear weapons which 
at that time become the third-largest 
nuclear weapon stockpile. 
Military relations are not only built on 
bilateral based ties, but also through 
multilateral engagement such as NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization). 
Since the dissolution of the Soviets, this 
organization has tried to forge partnerships 
with states in the Euro-Atlantic Area 
through the program called the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP). Through this intended for 
the trust-building program, Ukraine can 
establish military cooperation with the U.S 
and its allies in various matters, including 
joint training, defense sector reform, 
planning and response to non-traditional 
security issues such as disaster, 
environmental issues, to democratization 
within the framework of civil-military 
relations (NATO, 2017). 
The enhancement of defense relations 
has encouraged Ukraine's desire to become 
a NATO member state in 2008. Although 
it was not realized due to changes in the 
domestic political landscape, the Russian 
invasion of eastern Ukraine has once again 
stimulated Ukraine's desire to become a 
part of the NATO alliance (Bandow, 
2014).  
The conflict befallen Ukraine in recent 
years has caused the contribution of the 
United States so much awaited by the 
Ukrainian side as part of counterweight to 
the annexation of Crimea and other 
territories by the Russian military and pro-
Russian groups in the south and east of 
Ukraine. Meanwhile, for the United States 
and its allies, besides their balancing 
rationale, normatively, their presence in 
Ukraine is justified too as Russia's 
militarization is considered to violate 
Ukraine's sovereignty as stated in Budapest 
agreement back in 1994. For this reason, 
the US and its allies imposed economic 
sanctions on individuals and companies 
affiliated in supporting Russian annexation 
(U.S. Department of The Treasury, 2014). 
In return, Russia also blacklisted several 
parties that politically associated with its 
rival so that they are unable to enter 
Russian territory (Gutterman, 2014). As a 
result, this tit-for-tat does not make tension 
de-escalated, instead it intensifies the 
militarization surrounding the Sea of Azov 
and the Black Sea (Vasilyeva, 2018). 
Things are a little bit different as 
Donald Trump won the U.S presidential 
election back in November 2016. He has 
frequently demonstrated conflicting 
stances in several US Foreign policy 
behavior at a global level (Patrick, 2019; 
Acharya, 2018; Bennet, 2018). For 
example, Trump called for keeping its 
substantial military in the Middle East as 
his sign to launch more military operations 
in the future, shortly after he broke his 
commitment away, deciding to withdraw 
thousands of US military back home 
(Hennigan, 2018).  
In Ukraine, his initial decision to halt 
$400 million military assistance to Ukraine 
was considered conflicting to US 
commitment to provide security in Eastern 
Europe. Later on, it was known that the 
military assistance would be released 
provided that Ukraine obeys Trump 
political interest to investigate Joe Biden 
and his son Hunter Biden for what Trump 
believes have involved in corruption 
scandal while for the past 30 years the US 
has provided a lot of support to Ukraine, 
be it democratic reform, financial 
assistance, military aid, up until strong 
rhetorical support for Ukraine in term of 
Russia annexation of Crimea (PRI, 2019).  
However, that halt decision in July 2019 
ended up rapidly and eventually released in 
September that year amid no clear 
condition whether the Ukrainian side 
agrees to do what Trump demand.  
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Previous studies have elaborated more 
on how Trump military and foreign policy 
about the U.S role in global scale, naming 
it as nonexistent; haphazard and chaotic; 
transactional; pragmatic; up until 
Jacsonian-populism (Dombrowski & 
Reich, 2018). But the inquiry to explain 
Trump's rationale to halt and release 
military assistance, particularly and 
dyadically, to Ukraine remain 
understudied. As such, this study seeks to 
disentangle that anomaly decision by 
stating the following research puzzle: Why 
did the United States under the Trump 
administration demonstrate rapid changes 
from terminating military assistance in 
July to the release in September 2019 
about the US military assistance to 
Ukraine? 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
To answer the research puzzle above, this 
paper employs the Neoclassical Realism 
research program developed by Ripsman, 
Taliafero, and Lobell (Ripsman, N., 
Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016) as theoretical 
guidance. 
Considering foreign military assistance 
as a part of wider foreign policy or state's 
international political agenda, in the first 
place it is necessary to clarify where the 
state's foreign policy response derives. 
Two prominent approaches in international 
relations demonstrate intense dissimilarity. 
Those scholars in structural realism believe 
in the systemic stimuli (international 
pressure) where states exercise foreign 
policy as a response to the other actor 
behavior in the anarchic international 
system. Meanwhile, those innenpolitik 
scholars in liberal tradition argue that it is 
bottom-up made. Given its assumption that 
state is not unitary or independent actors, 
the theory believes that foreign policy and 
state's international politics is obtained as 
the aggregate preferences of the dominant 
societal coalition to explain state behavior 
(Ripsman, N., Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016).  
Neoclassical Realism places the two 
approaches above in the criticizing 
position. Innenpolitik is criticized for 
downplaying two insights. First, due to 
blindfolding the relative distribution of 
material power. Second, by getting rid of 
the central role of the state's foreign policy 
executive such as president, prime 
minister, key cabinet members, advisors 
charged with the conduct of foreign and 
defense policies.   
While its criticism for Structural 
Realism, despite their similarity in the 
philosophical foundation, lies on the 
balance of power expectation explaining 
that state will automatically balance 
against the threats that state face in the 
international arena. For Neoclassical 
Realism, seeing the balance of power 
behavior as a state of automatic affairs will 
be too reckless. Once deciding foreign 
policy, states face complex decision-
making environments. Their foreign 
behavior can become an anomaly in certain 
circumstances. As such they cannot always 
and automatically follow those structural 
realism proponent expectations to choose 
the most optimal policy response to the 
external environment such as balancing 
strategy. On the other hand, states must 
face a series of alternative policies that can 
navigate systemic constraints and domestic 
political imperatives that Structural 
Realism thinks it is not significant.  
To outsmart the deficiencies in 
Structural Realism and Innenpolitik 
theorist, Neoclassical Realists try to 
provide logical explanations to explain 
international politics in a series of 
variables, ranging from (1) independent 
variable, systemic stimuli that have causal 
importance; (2) intervening variable, 
domestic political factors affecting the 
process of perception, decision making, 
and its implementation; to (3) dependent 
variable, the policy choices made by states 
influenced by the international outcome 
and structural change in the international 
system (see figure below) (Ripsman, N., 
Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016). 
To understand systemic stimuli as the 
independent     variable,     defining     what 
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Figure 1. Neoclassical Realism Model 
Source:    Ripsman, N., Taliaferro & Lobell,  
                2016 
 
constitutes the international system -the 
political environment within which states 
interact should be clear in the first place. 
The international system in Neoclassical 
Realism conception is regarded as an 
interstate system within which those who 
are known as great powers become the 
most politically consequential actors given 
their relative power. Those in the system 
see international politics as a never-ending 
struggle for power and influence in the 
world that is bound to resource and having 
uncertainty about each other intention and 
capability. Factors affecting the ability and 
the willingness of units to interact, and 
determine what types of levels of 
interaction are both possible and desired 
can be seen through what is called 
"Structural modifiers" which includes 
geography, technological diffusion, and 
offense-defense balance in military 
technology. 
The next issue in the systemic variable 
should include what condition explains the 
international system within the meaning of 
the strategic environment and its clarity 
level. The former is defined as the 
magnitude and imminence of threats and 
opportunity the state face. The more 
imminent the threats and opportunities, the 
more dangerous the threats, making it a 
restrictive strategic environment. The state 
tends to balance in that environment. On 
the other hand, the more remote the 
opportunities and threats, the more 
permissive the strategic environment is. 
Thus, the state decides whether to balance 
or not will depend on domestic political 
circumstances. Meanwhile, the letter 
(clarity level) is defined as the degree to 
which the international system provides 
information about the nature of threats and 
opportunities, their time frame, and the 
optimal policy response to them. Those so-
called clear threats are states possessing 
three attributes: having revisionism or 
hostile other states territory, having a great 
capacity in military and economy, and a 
sense of imminence that is the capability to 
inflict in the short order (Gaddis, 1982; 
Walt, 1987). 
Shifted to intervening variables, the 
theory provides four categories to explain 
various constraints for the central actor 
(state) that can affect how the state 
responds to systemic or external stimuli. 
First, leader images. This variable was 
concerned with the beliefs of individuals 
who officiate at the helm of the state. They 
are named Foreign Policy Executives 
(FPE) consisting of a president, prime 
minister, dictator, key cabinet members, 
ministers, and advisors charged with the 
conduct of foreign and defense policies. 
For the neoclassical realist, investigating 
the character and psychological make-up 
of the political leader will be critical.  
Every FPE has core values, beliefs, and 
images guiding their interaction with 
others. Once formed, they act as the FPE 
cognitive filters that inform how leaders 
proceed with the information. All 
incoming information on international 
politics passes through these cognitive 
filters from which external stimuli are 
biased and personalized depending on the 
content of their images. 
Second   is    strategic   culture.   Snyder 
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defined strategic culture as the total of 
ideas, conditioned emotional responses, 
and patterns of habitual behavior that 
members of a national strategic community 
have acquired through instruction or 
imitation and share (Snyder, 1977). 
Meanwhile, Longhurst defined strategic 
culture as "a distinctive body of beliefs, 
attitudes, and practices regarding the use of 
force, which are held by a collective 
(usually a nation) and arise gradually over 
time, through a unique protracted historical 
process" (Longhurst, 2004). Here, culture 
is not defined in the conventional sense, 
rather suggest a distinctive approach 
toward strategy the state do derive from its 
history, geography, political culture, up to 
the aggregation of the attitudes and 
patterns of behavior of the most influential 
voices; these maybe, depending on the 
nation, the political elite, the military 
establishment and/or public opinion 
(Booth, 1990). Through socialization and 
institutionalization, the collective 
assumptions and expectations become 
entrenched and constrain a state’s behavior 
and freedom of action by defining what is 
acceptable and unacceptable strategic 
choices. 
The third is state-society relations. This 
variable encourages the researcher to 
investigate the character of interaction 
between the central institution of the state 
and various societal and economic groups. 
Should the relations be in harmony, the 
ability of the state to mobilize, extract, and 
harness national power can be much more 
effective and policymaking is consequently 
consistent with the structural realism 
model. In contrast, if harmony does not 
occur, the policymaking process would be 
extensive and the result of the policy 
would satisfy domestic interest rather than 
exclusively international consideration. 
Fourth, domestic institutions. This 
variable seeks to understand the 
institutional structure of the state, 
established by constitutional provisions 
that determine who can contribute to the 
policy formation, at what stage of the 
policy process, and who can act as veto 
players to block or reshape governmental 
policies. Therefore, this variable seeks to 
investigate, to say the least, the degree to 
which power is concentrated in executive-
legislative relations, party system, electoral 
system. For those adjusting democracy in 
substantial in which check and balance 
applied, the foreign policy decision making 
can be more complicated to the extent that 
they should hold extensive consultation 
with those opposition forces as their 
competitor over policies. As this occurs, 
those who govern should compromise or 
form a winning coalition to ensure a policy 
adoption (Ripsman, N., Taliaferro & 
Lobell, 2016). 
Turned into a dependent variable, the 
theory says it will vary depending on the 
time frame and receive influence within 
intervening variables. In the sort time, 
leader images matter most but as the 
decision time increase, individual leaders' 
control over policy decrease as many other 
actors such as legislatures, interest groups 
until society at large have the opportunity 
to contribute for devising policy solutions. 
Strategic culture affects both short- and 
long-term decision making. As a crisis 
happen, and a quick decision is expected, 
strategic culture may guide or constrain the 
choice of the use of force and foreign 
policymaking. 
In the longer term, those FPE draft 
plans for grand strategic adjustment. In this 
term, the leader is less likely to select 
policy options that contradict domestic 
value. The reason is, inter alia, to hold the 
leader's power if the decision can generate 
significant political opposition (Ripsman, 
N., Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016). As a matter 
of this fact, state-society and domestic 
institution have little influence on short 
term policy responses but is significant for 
longer range planning due to a quick 
response decision on foreign policy place 
disproportionate power in the hand of 
leader shaping national response. 
However dependent variable and how 
the intervening variable operates is 
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influenced by the independent variable in 
conditions that international system 
demonstrates four conditions. 
First, a restrictive model and high 
clarity. In it, FPE cannot have significant 
bargaining with domestic groups so 
domestic institutions and state-society 
cannot affect the policy. Instead what is 
most relevant in this situation would be 
strategic culture and leader image.  
While in a permissive strategic 
environment where states have no pressing 
threats and waning opportunities with high 
clarity, domestic institutions, and state-
society relations become more prominent. 
As the time protracted, FPE will face 
difficulty in mobilizing domestic support. 
That situation will make the leader image 
less relevant.  
As the clarity is the low and strategic 
environment is permissive, four clusters in 
the intervening variable can be relevant, 
policy priority is indeterminate due to the 
absence of a pressing threat.  
And in a situation filled by low clarity 
and restrictive, leader image and strategic 
culture can again become the most relevant 
due to the degree of threats and waning 
opportunity will encourage the national 
leader to ignore societal demand on 
strategic grounds. 
 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
This paper employs qualitative research, 
particularly the process-tracing method as 
the   author    considers   it   as    the    most  
 
representative method to trace and answer 
the causal mechanism of the research 
puzzles -Trump foreign military policy 
shift to Ukraine mentioned in the previous 
sections.   
As Derek Beach (Beach & Pedersen, 
2013) stated, process tracing is a method 
aimed at gaining a greater understanding of 
the causal mechanism from which the 
outcome is produced. This causal 
mechanism is defined as a complex 
system, which produces an outcome by the 
interaction of several parts (Beach & 
Pedersen, 2013). To seek that complex 
system, Neoclassical Realism with its 
arrangement of variables explained in the 
previous section helps compile what 
variables need to be investigated, linking 
cause or set of causes to the outcome. 
The focus of author data gathering is 
collected through document-based 
research. In doing so, the author will 
investigate relevant topics in explaining 
the halt policy in July and the release 
policy by investigating two kinds of 
document: (1) primary documents, 
consisting of those undergoing individuals 
who have a direct connection with the 
topics and original or official documents; 
(2) secondary documents, consisting of 
media reports, books, and scholarly 
articles.  In assuring the validity of the 
collected data, triangulation strategy by 
cross-checking data from multiple sources 
so as a balanced situation occurs will be 
employed during the inquiry process. 
Table 1. Intervening variables in their relation with the degree of systemic clarity and the nature of the 
strategic environment 
 Degree of systemic clarity 
High Low 
Nature of the strategic 
environment 
Restrictive Leader image and 
strategic culture 
Leader images and 
Strategic culture 
Permissive Strategic Culture, 
Domestic institutions, 
and State-society 
relations 
Indeterminate— all 
four clusters could be 
relevant 
Source: Ripsman, N., Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016 
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RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the 
operationalization of the analytical 
framework of the neoclassical realism 
model proposed by Ripsman, Taliaferro, 
and Lobell (Ripsman, N., Taliaferro & 
Lobell, 2016). In doing so, the first 
subsection will portray systemic stimuli as 
the independent variable. It will highlight 
the distribution of material power in 
Eastern Europe, the offense-defense 
balance between Russia and Ukraine, and 
the US military role in the region and 
supporting data to comprehend whether the 
nature of the strategic environment is 
restrictive or permissive and whether the 
systemic clarity is high or low. Then, in the 
next section, it will trace the perception, 
decision-making process, and policy 
implementation of US foreign military 
assistance to Ukraine. Intervening 
variables such as leader images, strategic 
culture, state-society, and domestic 
institutions will not be presented in a 
separate section, rather they will be used 
more loosely in each section as their 
explanation contributes to the issue. 
 
Shedding light on how the United States 
respond to systemic stimuli in Eastern 
Europe strategic environment  
In Eastern Europe, countries are hardly 
possible to exercise external balance 
against Russia unless they, particularly 
Ukraine, seek it by becoming NATO 
member states. It is so because there is a 
vast discrepancy in military balance which 
shows Russia superiority (see figure 1.) 
(SIPRI, 2020). Once they attempt to do so, 
Russia's reaction would strictly be in 
disagreement and then deploy its military 
to thwart their political eagerness. It has 
happened at least twice in the last fifteen 
years, first in Georgia (2008) and second in 
Ukraine (2014-present) which both states 
previously aspired to be out of Russia 
sphere of interest and turn around toward 
NATO or the West in general. 
For the United States and its allies, 
securing their interest in Eastern Europe 
particularly Ukraine is geopolitically 
important to make a sure balance of power 
indwell. And for the United States, in 
particular, it seems that its historical 
competition during the Cold War and the 
agenda of liberal idealism have shaped its 
strategic culture to have deep distrust to 
Russia despite the war has ended and 
slightly different view of the current 
president toward Russia (Mahnken, 2006; 
Hudak, 2019).  
 
Figure 2. Eastern Europe military expenditure  
                by current USD 2008-2018 
Source:   SIPRI, 2020 
 
In 1994, US National Security Advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote an article in 
Foreign Affairs stating that, in essence, 
Ukraine position is geopolitically 
significant for United States interest in 
Europe. The stronger Ukraine, the higher 
probability of Russia regional dominance 
to be thwarted. On the contrary, in case 
Ukraine is on a brink of disaster, the crisis 
may be exploited to promote the breakup 
of Ukraine as an independent state or the 
reintegration of it to Russia-dominated 
framework. As this happens, Russia shall 
reemerge as an empire. Accordingly, the 
United States needs to engage the 
Ukrainian government through the 
substantial economy and security 
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assistance while the place Russia remains 
in a potential threat despite the cold war 
ended (Brzezinski, 1994). 
After the article was published, several 
initiatives aiming at political assurance 
have been popped up by the United States, 
commenced by the signing of Budapest 
Memorandum 1994 to the current initiative 
such as Ukrainian Security Assistance 
Initiative (Welt, 2019). 
Center for International Policy, an 
organization aimed at tracking US security 
sector assistance, demonstrated in detail 
how far the U.S security assistance to 
Ukraine is. Its data show that along with 
Russia annexation in 2014, the U.S 
assistance has grown in number compared 
to its aid from the 2000-2013 fiscal year 
which never exceeds 100 million dollars 
(Center for International Policy, 2020a). 
 
 
Figure 3. U.S Security Aid to Ukraine 
Source:    Center for International Policy,  
                2020b 
 
Based on the same dataset from 2014 to 
2019, US security assistance seemed to 
focus on, but not limited to, five programs 
namely: (1) Foreign Military Financing, 
worth $467,103,000; (2) International 
Military Education and Training worth 
$17,320,000; (3) Non-proliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining and Related 
Programs, worth $54,440,000 (4) 
International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement worth $85,800,000; (5) 
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, 
created in 2016, worth $1,026,530,000 
(Center for International Policy, 2020a). 
It is difficult not to associate that rapid 
upsurge for the last five years with Russia 
military aggression in southern and eastern 
Ukraine within which is read by the US 
and its European ally as an existential 
threat, let alone that they are in the 
imminent geography. 
Besides, the other two trends support 
the argument that the United States and 
Russia negatively see one another. First is 
demonstrated by recent public opinion and 
second by military relations. 
For the US public, as Gallup polls told, 
Russia is among the top four to be 
perceived as US greatest enemy in 
conjunction with other countries that 
politically closed to it such as China, North 
Korea, and Iran. As a matter of fact, for the 
last four years, it becomes the first place 
twice in polls, amounts to 18% in 2015, 
and 32% in 2019, making it as so-called 
the US chief enemy (Gallup, 2020). 
Besides, the survey in 2019 revealed that 
the majority of Americans (52%) 
perceived that Russia military power poses 
a threat to U.S vital interests. That number 
is tripled compared to the survey with the 
same question back in 2004. 
In military and strategic relations, 
despite demonstrating cooperative 
measures in non-traditional issues and 
other confidence-building measures such 
as NATO-Russia council or Russia 
participation in Partnership for Peace 
program, Russia and the US relation 
remain stubborn. It is noted that before 
Russia annexation to Ukraine, both powers 
had a tense confrontation on several cases 
including Kosovo War (1999), Georgia 
War (2008), and US Plan to build 
European Missile Interception in Poland 
and a radar installation in Czech near 
Russia border (2008). And now it is going 
on in Crimea and Donbas, Ukraine 
(Keaney, 2020; BBC News, 2000). 
Before Russia annexation, there were 
three months of length public unrest in 
Kiev from November 2013 to February 
2014. This massive protest was sparked by 
Ukrainian ex-President Yanukovych 
decision to postpone his country closer 
relation with EU under the Ukrainian-EU 
$0
$100.000.000
$200.000.000
$300.000.000
$400.000.000
$500.000.000
1998 2004 2009 2014 2020
U.S Security Aid to Ukraine
 Rangga Amalul Akhli/Jurnal Pertahanan Vol. 6 No. 2 (2020) pp.174-189 
 
183 
 
Association Agreement which covers 
multifaceted areas including trade, visa-
free, infrastructure, up until foreign and 
security policy from which Ukraine would 
intensify dialogue under Common Security 
and Defense Policy. On the contrary, he 
opted to have closer ties with Russia, 
which afterward dragged him out of the 
office and fled to Russia (EUR-Lex, 2020; 
BBC News, 2014). 
However, those large-scale Ukrainian 
protests did not represent a single, solid 
voice of the population. Ukrainian is 
segregated into two factions: those 
favoring EU and those favoring Russia 
located in eastern and southern of state. 
This led Russia various forms of 
intervention to expand easier to that area. 
What suffered more for Ukrainian 
security ahead of Russia annexation was 
that it had no sufficient military capacity to 
push backward Russia military operation 
(SIPRI, 2015; Davis, 2016). It is likely, to 
cite Robert Jervis offense-defense balance 
theory (Jervis, 2017), for Russia the time 
has come to offense since it has an 
advantage in technological and offensive 
weapons than its neighbor rival and even 
more there is no guarantee to stay silent 
while its buffer zone to Europe can, in the 
longer term, threaten its security. Later, if 
Putin did not lie when saying "Russians 
and Ukrainians are one people...one 
nation” in an interview with Oliver Stone, 
it may be assumed that what Russia 
strategic goal is not only the control over 
Crimea and Donbas but Ukraine territory 
as a whole (Associated Press News, 2017). 
 
Table 2. Comparison of armed force between 
Russia and Ukraine in 2013 
 Russia Ukraine 
Military personnel 845,000 129,950 
Tanks 2550 1110 
Artillery 5436 1952 
Combat aircrafts 1389 139 
Helicopters 392 221 
Defense % GDP 3.1 1.3 
Source: Christopher Mark Davis (Davis, 2016)  
The Ukraine conflict, economic–
military power balances and economic 
sanctions, Post-Communist 
Economies, 28:2, 167-198, DOI: 
10.1080/14631377.2016.1139301 
 
 
A month after the large-scale protest in 
Kiev, Crimean, Russian speaking 
population, held a referendum on March 
16. It resulted in the majority of the 
population wanted to join Russia despite 
most of the international community 
refused to recognize that referendum. 
Leader of Crimea and Putin signed a treaty 
accepting Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol as part of Russia territory. A 
couple of weeks before, soldiers with 
green army uniforms carrying Russia 
military equipment: wearing flak jackets, 
holding rocket-propelled grenade 
launchers, and sniper rifles blockaded 
Simferopol International Airport, a seized 
government building. Russia called them 
as self-defense groups while his rival 
accused it as a part of Russian Invaders 
(Shevchenko, 2014; Siddique, McCarthy, 
& Yuhas, 2014). 
As the Crimea annexation was 
considered successful, Russia subsequently 
increased its military presence in the 
region by deploying more than 30,000 
troops, bringing S-400 surface to air 
missile system and other advanced 
weaponry, and began to set up military 
task force there focusing on, to say the 
least, two things. First, securing some 
areas of Arabat Spit and Kherson Oblast 
which housed a gas distribution center. 
Second, control over the strait of Kerch 
located between Sea of Azov and the 
Black Sea from which Russia fired and 
seized two Ukrainian artillery boat and a 
tugboat in 2018 (Baker & Kramer, 2014; 
BBC News, 2018; Welt, 2019). 
Donbas -refer to Donetsk and Luhansk 
located in eastern Ukraine is the second 
flashpoint where armed conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine is exercised. Several 
cities were forcibly occupied by separatists 
associated with Russia the so-called 
Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk 
People’s Republic. To restore state control, 
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Ukraine Force and volunteers were there 
but suffered major defeats in three battles 
which Russia force reportedly joined in (1) 
Ilovaisk from August to September 2014; 
(2) Donetsk Airport from September 2014 
to January 2015; (3) Debaltseve from 
January to February 2015 (Welt, 2019).  
Besides Russia, Ukraine has also 
incorporated several militias to its force. 
According to Mironova and Segatskova 
(Mironova & Sergatskova, 2017), at the 
start of the war, 30 armed groups quickly 
consolidated into five main militia, namely 
(1) Right-Wing; (2) Azov; (3) Aidar; (4) 
Donbas; (5) Dnepr 1 at the uncertain 
number (Mironova & Sergatskova, 2017).  
However, despite elements of militia 
demonstrated resistance against Putin and 
Russian backed rebels, these groups can 
also pose a serious threat to the future 
government of Ukraine. Azov Batallion 
may receive government support from 
Minister of the Interior, but they are known 
as neo-Nazi sympathies; Right Sector 
operates independently as they refused to 
register with the government; Dnipro, 
about its loyalty for the country, is 
doubtful since they are oligarch funded. 
But again, for this short time, Ukrainian 
only has few options (Taub, 2015; Cohen, 
2018). 
As Ukraine repeatedly ask western 
countries to sell or give more lethal 
equipment that it lacks, such as electronic 
weapon systems to protect aircraft against 
SAM, artillery-locating radar, radio, UAV, 
up until body armor, United States under 
Obama administration and its NATO allies 
seemed to take steps carefully whether 
they need to arm Ukraine or not. As a 
result, they only focus on non-lethal 
weapon supply considering the following 
conditions:  
1. The possibility of escalating the conflict 
with Russia. 
2. The need to maintain the conditions for 
a successful diplomatic process based 
on economic and political sanctions on 
Russia, economic aid to Ukraine, and 
negotiations. 
3. That the Ukrainian armed forces were 
in too much disarray to absorb large 
numbers of new weapons. 
4. That delivery would not change the 
balance in access to weapons since 
Russia could increase deliveries to the 
rebels (SIPRI, 2015). 
Under Trump administration, the US 
military assistance seemed to be shifted 
from the Obama approaches. Trump 
appeared to be bolder in providing lethal 
weapons to Ukraine. Throughout 2017 he 
was actively reviewing the question of 
lethal assistance. As a result, in 2018 the 
Department of State agreed to provide 
foreign military sales of 210 Javelin 
portable anti-tank missiles, 37 launchers, 
and associated equipment (Martinez, 
2019). And in June 2019, Department of 
Defense through Security Assistance 
Initiative FY 2019 stated that it would 
allocate $250 million to enhance Ukrainian 
maritime awareness, provide sniper rifles, 
rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 
counter artillery radar and for Ukraine's 
Land and Special Forces; mobile command 
and control, electronic warfare detection 
and secure communications; military 
mobility; night vision; and, military 
medical treatment (Welt, 2019). 
 
In the process of halting and releasing 
the foreign military assistance decision 
Despite posing a stronger form of external 
balancing strategy against Russia 
annexation, US military assistance to 
Ukraine in 2019 brought a series of a 
different situation. In its process, rapid 
shift policy was exhibited when the US 
decided to halt military assistance in July, 
and shortly after, released it in September. 
Two factors are intertwined. First, Trump's 
interest was behind the frozen policy, 
while US domestic institution structure and 
strategic culture allowed Trump's interest 
to be cracked and challenged.  
In democratic states such as the United 
States, those who eager to become 
president should compete through the 
election and when he or she is elected, he 
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or she is given the second chance to return 
to the office as the United States 
constitution permit two-term limits. This 
second chance is sought too by Trump who 
will compete in the next presidential race 
in late 2020. But his first three years in 
office seems did not show a great number 
of approvals as many polls tracing public 
opinion demonstrated ‘majority 
disapprove’ with the current president job. 
What he needed to do politically was to 
revamp the situation by lessening his rival, 
Democrat to achieve more public support. 
To do so, he attempted to reverse the 
public narrative of his scandal with Russia 
and seek the deceitful possibility of a 
Democrat presidency candidate and 
Ukraine is seen as a perfect object to 
process his plan. 
In February 2019, Congress authorized 
the aid to Ukraine in the fiscal budget 2019 
within which the Department of Defense 
would provide 250 million dollars for 
military aid and the Department of State 
would provide $141,5. Million for other 
purposes.  
On June 18, DoD released news 
regarding equipment and military services 
that the US would provide to Ukraine (US 
Dept of Defense, 2019).  
A month later, it seemed that the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) placed 
a hold military aid package under the order 
from Trump and no one at the office knew 
the exact time of the hold duration would 
be lifted meanwhile the fiscal year would 
end in the end of September (Welna, 
2019). This act could be seen as violating 
the 1974 Impoundment Control Act due to 
the president's unilateral movement, 
whereas it has to tell or notify Congress 
before the decision (Gringlas & Pao, 
2019). At the end of July, Trump had a call 
with Ukrainian President, Zelenskiy and 
asked him a favor to probe his leading 
domestic political rival Joe Biden and his 
son Hunter Biden activities in Ukraine and 
disproved the claim that Russia hacked the 
computer server of Democratic National 
Committee (Welna, 2019). 
Trump's decision to halt the military 
assistance seemed disappointing to many 
sides, particularly some military and 
intelligence officers. It also becomes a 
serious national concern in the United 
States after a whistleblower filed a 
complaint of what happened about 
Ukraine-US relation to Richard Burr and 
Adam Schiff, chair of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee on August 12, and 
publicly gained a wider audience as 
mainstream media such as Politico (28 
August) or The Washington Post (5 
September) reported the issue, marking 
clearer that this assistance could not be 
aside from the US presidential election 
preparation that will be held in 2020 
(CNN, 2019). 
The complaint, as went to be a public 
consumption, disclosed new important 
elucidation that Trump tried to solicit 
Ukraine to interfere with the US 
presidential election in the upcoming 2020. 
Trump and his team saw that there would 
be a political advantage to raise the Biden 
issue in Ukraine about his energy company 
in that country, Burisma Holdings. 
In the beginning, Shokin, Ukraine 
Prosecutor General 2015-2016, probed 
Biden Burisma company activities but 
stopped in the middle of the road as Biden 
allegedly ask Ukraine President Porosenko 
to sack Shokin so that he could not tar 
Biden’s reputation. Shokin position was 
succeeded by Lutsenko. Instead of 
stopping the investigation, the newly 
elected prosecutor seemed to continue his 
predecessor's work after Trump and his 
team endorsement. 
In 2019, Giuliani, Trump's lawyer, with 
the help of Shokin, corresponded with 
Lutsenko in New York (late January) and 
Warsaw (mid-February) from which he 
was allegedly willing to help Trump 
(Unian, 2019). Due to that conversation, in 
late March Lutsenko made a series of 
allegations against Ukrainian officials and 
current and former US officials who 
politically associate with Biden.  
But  the  situation  was harder in Trump  
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and his team perspective when there was a 
domestic political transition in Ukraine. A 
Ukrainian presidential candidate, 
Zelensky, who promised to replace 
Lutsenko from his office, won the election 
on April 21, 2019. For Trump's point of 
view, this reality would complicate his 
interest. He needed to find a new strategy 
to keep Lutsenko still at his office. 
Meanwhile, Zelenskyy, per se, besides his 
efforts to subdue corruption, was 
encouraged to make sure American 
military assistantships went in a good 
manner as one of his short-term priorities 
to overcome the Ukraine-Russia crisis in 
his eastern and southern territory. What 
Trump thought a solution for this matter is 
best drawn by quid pro quo frameworks, a 
Latin phrase meaning a favor for a favor. 
He wanted Ukrainian to do what he 
commands, so the foreign military 
assistance that Ukraine urgently needs 
would be channeled.    
Shortly after the Zelenskyy winning 
announcement on April 21, Trump indeed 
had a brief call with Zelensky to 
congratulate and invite him to the White 
House. However, the meeting itself was 
never been realized until the end of 
September despite the requests were 
offered several times by the Ukrainian 
side.  
Trump was not willing to meet 
Zelenskyy before he complies with 
Trump's demands but Zelensky and his 
team perceived that Trump's demands were 
way too risky to do. That was depicted by 
several meetings between Trump aides and 
Ukrainian president delegations during 
May and June that reached nothing. The 
peak was when Trump officially decided to 
withhold that military assistance by July 
12, turning the coercion into a new 
different level than before.   
However, a report made by the US 
House of Representatives titled 'The 
Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry" 
demonstrated a more complex situation 
within US officials. During a series of 
policy meetings involving senior officials 
and relevant actors associated with this 
matter, many officials instead supported 
the release of the funding arguing that 
supporting Ukraine was in the national 
security interest of the United States. On 
the contrary, if the president continued to 
withhold the assistance, Trump, they 
concerned, would face legality issues with 
the Congress. It turned out that the 
decision was also problematic in the 
United States and did not reach a 
compromise as soon as the decision passed 
(US House of Representatives, 2019). 
As time goes by, policy options for 
Trump were increasingly limited. House 
Representatives, after the whistleblower 
complaint and media reports on the 
military assistance withheld, turned to be a 
fierce barrier for the executive to continue 
such policy. And that Trump seemed to 
end the halt by 11 September. He picked 
corruption concern as his rationale to 
withheld such assistance and denied all 
statements linking with his political 
interest as his exit plan but it did not end 
up the House Representative investigation 
to impeach him (Rupar, 2019).      
 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, the US military assistance 
policy to Ukraine in 2019 demonstrating 
twist and turn circumstances on the US 
side is due to the internal collision in a 
growing unusual demand to benefit 
Trump’s political interest regarding 
presidential race in its process against the 
US traditional values and institutional 
mechanism rather than a decision based 
strategic calculation, as this move 
eventually endanger Trump position to 
keep in power. 
For Trump, this decision is necessary to 
outperform his rival candidates in the 
Democratic Party as he knew his position 
was at risk since his approval rating 
conducted by several survey agencies was 
always disappointing. Even worse the next 
election is near to come. Incorporating that 
Ukrainian prosecutor to investigate Biden 
in   his   third   year   would   politically  be  
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influential to turn things around. 
As the initial step, Trump likely got it. 
Nevertheless, he failed to convince some 
officials in the military and intelligence 
office that his decision is fully part of US 
national security and interest. As a result, a 
whistleblower who is allegedly part of the 
intelligence officer anonymously leaked 
the issue to the House of Representatives, 
and as time goes by scattered to media. 
What whistleblower did is in part 
associated with US strategic culture. US 
public and military consistently show 
distrust to Russia rather than other states as 
some polls revealed. Thus, terminating 
foreign military assistance to Ukraine will 
mean strengthening Russia's power, the US 
chief of the enemy. 
For Trump to be elected, implementing 
a policy that opposite with public 
perception can jeopardize his position and 
degrade his second chance to win 
presidential elections. His choice, by all 
means, was increasingly restricted as time 
goes by. The rational decision thus is to 
release foreign military assistance to 
Ukraine and put some issues to obscure his 
political interest. 
Hence, factors contribute to the rapid 
changes in the US foreign military 
assistance to Ukraine are influenced by 
Trump images or personal political 
interest, the internal conflict in FPE, 
strategic culture, and domestic institution. 
Theoretically speaking, despite Structural 
Realism prediction on the balance of 
power might be correct, but Neoclassical 
Realism provides a better framework and 
mechanism to arrive at that outcome 
policy. 
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